Publications
Charles Vellutini
ECOPA contributed four chapters to this Word Bank book on risk-based tax audits (2011).

"Risk-Based Tax Audits brings together first-hand country experiences of how various tax administrations have undertaken reforms to implement risk-based audit systems. It evaluates their success while examining the fundamental principles of risk-based audits, the behavioral aspects of tax compliance, and the institutional challenges they present. Drawing from contributions by tax administrators and international experts, the book also serves as a resource for analytical techniques used in risk-based audit strategies."

See World Bank website: "Risk-Based Tax Audits"


Antoine Belgodere, Charles Vellutini

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, 1–4, iFirst

This article presents a simple Monte Carlo (MC) procedure to improve sensitivity analysis in computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling. MC experiments provide the modeller with a population of randomly drawn exogenous parameters and corresponding endogenous outcomes. Standard econometrics can then shed light on the relationship between them and help to identify key parameters, particularly key elasticities.

288_belgodere_vellutini_2011.pdf Monte Carlo approach - Antoine Belgodere and Charles Vellutini  (108.99 KB)



Philippe Marcoul, Luc Veyssiere

American journal of agricultural economics 2010, vol. 92, no4, pp. 1051-1064

Traditional moneylenders monitor farmers to ensure that their investment is not diverted. Modern farming contracts offered by supermarkets in developing countries often entail a loan component, and monitoring arises as well. However, unlike moneylenders, supermarkets do care about the attributes of the product. Whether such attributes are obtained is influenced largely by the advice and the extension services received by farmers. We build a financial contracting model where we show that supermarkets optimally undertake both the monitoring and the advisory missions. This contract is shown to potentially enhance credit access for small farmers but sometimes also involves excessive monitoring.


Marie-Antoinette Maupertuis and Charles Vellutini

Revue d'Economie Rurale et Urbaine, Number 5, 2009
The first social accounting matrix (SAM) of Corsica is presented for the year 2003. The SAM describes the structure of the Corsican economy in a consistent macroeconomic framework, including an input-output table with five sectors; a balance of payments and an analysis of the main economic transactions between Corsica, the rest of France, the rest of the world, the French central government and local authorities. Another contribution of the SAM is to provide analysts with an empirical basis for applied economic modelling in Corsica. In particular, the SAM paves the way for the development of a Computable General Equilibrium model of Corsica.


158_maupertuis_vellutini_reru_2009.pdf Social accounting matrix for Corsica - Maupertuis and Vellutini  (2.29 MB)


158_mcs_corse_2003_1.xlsx Download the social accounting matrix  (18.37 KB)



Georges Casamatta and Charles Vellutini

Journal of Development Economics, Volume 87, Issue 2, October 2008, Pages 322-332

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyse the impact of aid on the political equilibrium of a recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives, interested in promoting social welfare but also valuing the benefits of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefits of power. Using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark, we conclude that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and so quality of policy in the recipient country depends on the value of the elasticity of marginal consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome moves further from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of conditionality in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.

157_clientelism_and_aid_jde_2008.pdf Clientelism and aid - Georges Casamatta et Charles Vellutini  (221.02 KB)



1 2 3